Hybrid Voting Model for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations with Dynamic Quorum

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20535/2786-8729.6.2025.337564

Abstract

The article examines the problem of balancing security and flexibility in decision-making mechanisms within decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), which operate without centralized control through the use of smart contracts. To this end, two main voting models employed in DAOs are analyzed: the conjunctive model, which requires unanimous approval of a proposal by all participant groups, and the disjunctive model, where approval from a single group is sufficient. Both models have significant advantages and drawbacks: the former ensures a high level of security and protection of all parties’ interests but considerably slows down the decision-making process, while the latter provides speed and scalability but introduces risks of centralized influence.

In response to these challenges, a hybrid voting model is proposed, in which the type of logic is determined by the nature of the proposal. Specifically, critical changes, such as updates to governance rules or quorum parameters, must involve all groups, whereas routine operational matters can be decided through a simplified disjunctive procedure. The implemented smart contract architecture supports both mechanisms and enables DAOs to dynamically adjust quorum thresholds through separate governance proposals.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the model, a simulation of 1,000 voting processes was conducted under four different scenarios of participant activity: balanced, one-sided, and low overall participation. The results showed a reduction in the probability of deadlock situations and an increase in the share of successful votes when hybrid logic was applied, particularly under conditions of low or asymmetric participation. In addition, special attention was given to gas cost optimization: the disjunctive approach allows vote counting to be stopped once a quorum is reached by one group, thus reducing overall computational expenses.

Therefore, the proposed solution appears promising for both financial DAOs and decentralized infrastructures, particularly the Internet of Things, where speed, scalability, and secure coordination are especially important.

Author Biographies

Roman Serebriakov, National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, Kyiv

PhD student, Department of Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

Iryna Klymenko, National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, Kyiv

Professor of the Computer Engineering Department of the Faculty of informatics and Computer Technique, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor

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Published

2025-09-19

How to Cite

[1]
R. Serebriakov and I. . Klymenko, “Hybrid Voting Model for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations with Dynamic Quorum”, Inf. Comput. and Intell. syst. j., no. 6, pp. 192–202, Sep. 2025.